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Abstract
This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in
quasilinear economies. This result is informed by the analysis of non-cooperative
dynamic search and bargaining games. Such games provide models of decentralized
markets with trading frictions. A central objective of this literature is to investigate
how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions. In particular, does
the trading outcome become Walrasian when frictions become small? Existing
specications of such games provide divergent answers. The characterization result
is used to investigate what causes these di¤erences and to generalize insights from
the analysis of specic search and bargaining games.
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1 Introduction
In a dynamic matching and bargaining game, a large population of traders interacts
repeatedly in a decentralized market.1 Every trading period, traders are matched to
form small groups where they bargain over the terms of trade. If they fail to reach an
agreement, they can wait at some cost until the next period to be rematched into a
new group. These waiting costs are the frictions of trading in the decentralized market.
A major question in the literature concerns the trading outcome when frictions become
small: Does the outcome become Walrasian? Ideally, one would like not only to nd
answers for particular trading institutions, but also to gain a general understanding of
the conditions under which trading with vanishing frictions has this property and the
conditions under which it does not. In this paper I use methods from cooperative and
non-cooperative game theory to address this question. Recent contributions that fall into
the framework of this paper include work by Moreno and Wooders (2002), Mortensen and
Wright (2002), Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007), and De Fraja and Sakovics (2001).
The main result modies a characterization result from cooperative game theory for
quasilinear economies by Shapley and Shubik (1971): If an allocation is feasible then it is
competitive if and only if it is pairwise e¢ cient (pairwise stable). I weaken the requirement
that the outcome must be pairwise e¢ cient for all pairs of traders. Instead, I require the
outcome to be pairwise e¢ cient for traders who trade with probability less than one. I
introduce two new conditions (Monotonicity and No Rent Extraction) to characterize the
trading outcome for traders who trade with certainty.
The characterization result is informed by the analysis of non-cooperative dynamic
matching and bargaining games. The reason for weakening pairwise e¢ ciency to a subset
of traders is that, in such games, traders with types who transact with probability one
leave the market quickly. Other traders might therefore not be matched with them and
the allocation does not need to be pairwise e¢ cient with respect to these types.2
As an illustration of the main result, I use a parameterized class of steady-state search
and bargaining games that is similar to the one used by Gale (1987). There is a continuum
1The literature on dynamic matching and bargaining games is vast. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)
and Gale (2000) are excellent surveys. Diamond (1971) demonstrated that small frictions can lead to
severe distortions. Subsequent work was done by Gale (1986, 1987), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985,
1990), McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991) and extended in various directions by DeFraja and Sakovics
(2001), Serrano (2002), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Kunimoto and Serrano (2004), Satterthwaite and
Shneyerov (2007, 2008), Atakan (2007), and Shneyerov and Wong (2010)
2Dagan, Serrano, and Volij (2000) also combine cooperative and non-cooperative elements to analyze
dynamic matching and bargaining games. However, they assume that all coalitions can form and they
provide a characterization result for a general economy.
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of buyers who have unit demand and valuations (types) v 2 [0; 1] for an indivisible good,
and there is a continuum of sellers who have unit capacity and costs c 2 [0; 1]. These
traders are matched into small groups. In these groups, they bargain, and, if they reach
an agreement, they trade. The groups are connected to form a large market by allowing
unsuccessful traders to be matched into new groups in the next period. Integration,
however, is imperfect because there is a probability (exit rate) that a trader dies while
waiting. These are the frictions of trading. Finally, at the end of each period, there is an
exogenous inow of new buyers and sellers.
This class of games allows for a variety of specications of the matching technology and
of the bargaining protocol. Regardless of how matching and bargaining is specied, the
game and its solution concept will give rise to an outcome that consists of (a) probabilities
of trading for entering types and (b) expected equilibrium payo¤s. An outcome is called
feasible if it is consistent with an allocation for the quasilinear economy dened by the
distribution of buyers valuations and sellers costs.
Suppose there is some sequence of exit rates ("frictions") that converges to zero. In
addition, suppose that for each exit rate an equilibrium outcome of a specic trading game
is selected. This denes a sequence of outcomes. I state conditions on this sequence that
are jointly necessary and su¢ cient for convergence to the competitive outcome. The rst
condition, Monotonicity, requires that trading probabilities are monotone buyers with
higher valuations are more likely to trade, while sellers with higher costs are less likely to
trade. The second condition, No Rent Extraction, requires that traders receive some part
of the surplus they generate. Technically, this is a condition on the slope of the payo¤s.
The third and the fourth conditions are jointly equivalent to pairwise e¢ ciency of types
who do not trade with certainty. Specically, the third condition, Availability, requires
that traders who do not trade with certainty are available. In the application, a type
is available if others are matched frequently with traders having such types. The fourth
condition, Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency, requires that for all pairs of buyers and sellers who
are both available the sum of their expected payo¤s is at least as large as the payo¤s
they could realize by trading with each other. The Availability condition relates to the
matching technology, whereas the other conditions relate to the bargaining protocol. The
main result (Proposition 1) is essentially this: A sequence of feasible outcomes converges
to the Walrasian outcome if and only if the four conditions hold.
I apply this result to the parameterized dynamic matching and bargaining game
introduced before. I show how to verify each of the conditions. Importantly, I argue that
the conditions often follow from basic equilibrium restrictions onto outcomes. It is not
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necessary to actually compute the equilibrium outcomes. The main result applies to all
trading games that map quasilinear economies into trading outcomes. It extends therefore
well beyond the parameterized example and its particular form of trading frictions. I
comment extensively on how the conditions of the result can be veried for general
matching technologies and bargaining protocols.
Whenever convergence fails in some model, at least one of the conditions must be
violated, which allows a "classication" of such failures. I show that the failure in
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) and in Serrano (2002) can be linked to a failure of
Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency (the fourth condition), the failure in Lauermann (2011) to rent
extraction (a failure of the second condition), and the failure in Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1985) and in De Fraja and Sakovics (2001) can be linked to a failure of feasibility; that is,
the limit outcome does not correspond to an allocation that is feasible in the benchmark
economy. By stating necessary conditions, the main result suggests conditions under
which decentralized trading is not well approximated by market clearance.
2 The Model
I consider a trading environment that consists of buyers and sellers who want to trade an
indivisible good. This trading environment, together with the feasibility condition, denes
the general model. The traders (or agents) have quasilinear preferences and maximize
expected payo¤s. The sellers each have one unit of the good, and their costs of trading
are given by c 2 [0; 1]. The buyers each want to buy one unit of the good, and their
valuations of the good are given by v 2 [0; 1]. If a seller trades with a buyer at a price
p, the payo¤s are p  c and v   p, respectively. An abstract economy is characterized by
two functions GS (c) and GB (v) that map the unit interval into itself. The functions are
zero at zero, and they are strictly increasing and continuously di¤erentiable.
The functions GS (c) and GB (v) are interpreted as dening a large, static economy
with transferable utility (quasilinear preferences). GS (c) is the mass of sellers with costs
below c, and GB (v) is the mass of buyers with valuations below v.3 (In Section 4, GS
and GB dene a constant exogenous inow of new traders into a dynamic economy.) Let
pw be dened as the Walrasian price such that the mass of sellers having costs below pw
is equal to the mass of buyers having a valuation above pw, GS (pw) = GB (1) GB (pw).
Since GS and GB are strictly increasing and continuous functions, the market clearing
3In general, GS (1) and GB (1) do not need to be one, which allows modelling large economies with a
di¤erent mass of agents on each side.
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price exists and is unique.
A trading outcome is a vector A =

V S; V B; QS; QB

, where V S (c) and V B (v) are the
expected payo¤s, and QS (c) and QB (v) are the trading probabilities of the sellers and
buyers. An outcome does not explicitly specify the transfers that are made between buyers
and sellers. However, in a quasilinear environment with risk-neutral agents, the di¤erence
between the expected consumption value vQB (v) and the expected payo¤ V B (v) is equal
to the transfer made by the buyer, and the sum of the expected cost cQS (c). Similarly,
the expected payo¤ V S (c) is equal to the transfer received by the seller. I do not include
transfers explicitly in the outcome because the previous discussion implies that transfers
would be redundant. Let  denote the set of measurable functions f : [0; 1]! [0; 1]. Any
element of 4 constitutes an outcome.
An outcome denes a feasible allocation for an economy given by GS (c) and GB (v) if
the following two statements are true. First, the total mass of the buyers who trade equals
the total mass of the sellers who trade, that is,
R 1
0
QS (c) dGS (c) =
R 1
0
QB (v) dGB (v).
Second, the total amount of transfers collectively made by buyers equal the total amount of
transfers received by sellers,
R 1
0
 
v QB (v)  V B (v) dGB (v) = R 1
0
 
V S (c) + cQS (c)

dGS (c).
An outcome that meets these two requirements satises the feasibility condition.
Given an outcome, the trading surplus is dened as S (A)  R 1
0
V B (v) dGB (v) +R 1
0
V S (c) dGS (c). The surplus coincides with the ex-ante expected payo¤s. The object of
interest is the maximal surplus that can be realized subject to the feasibility constraint.
The maximal surplus is denoted by S. If the outcomes are feasible, the transfers cancel,
and the surplus is solely determined by the allocation of the indivisible good given by the
trading probabilities Q =

QS; QB

. Denote the set of Walrasian allocations by QW (it
is a set because QS and QB are not determined at the point pw). It is straightforward to
verify that an outcome is e¢ cient if and only if the allocation of the good is Walrasian
(this is the analogue of the First and SecondWelfare Theorem for a quasilinear economy).4
Lemma 1 For all outcomes that satisfy feasibility: S (A) = S if and only if Q 2 QW ,
where QW is the set of functions such that for sellers, QS (c) = 1 if c < pw and QS (c) = 0
if c > pw and for buyers, QB (v) = 1 if v > pw and QB (v) = 0 if v < pw.
Suppose that for any pair of types c and v the sum of their interim expected payo¤s
V S (c) + V B (v) is weakly larger than their private surplus v   c. Intuitively, all gains
4The surplus does not change if a zero measure of traders has trading probabilities di¤erent from QW .
Therefore, I state the lemma for the equivalence class of the set QW , which is denoted by

QW

. Two
functions are equivalent if the integral of their di¤erence is zero.
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from trade are exhausted. Following Feldman (1973), such an outcome is called pairwise
e¢ cient. Pairwise e¢ ciency is equivalent to pairwise stability. Let V W denote Walrasian
payo¤s, where V W =
 
V S; V B

, with V S = max fpw   c; 0g, and V B = max fv   pw; 0g.
Let AW denote the set of Walrasian outcomes with Q 2 QW and V = V W . The following
Lemma restates a well-known result by Shapley and Shubik (1971), which is readily
extended to the continuum case considered here.
Lemma 2 Suppose an outcome A satises Feasibility. Then,
A 2 AW  , V S (c) + V B (v)  v   c 8v; c.
3 The Main Result
3.1 Summary and Conditions
Let fAkg1k=1 be a sequence of outcomes. In Section 4, I obtain such a sequence as the
sequence of outcomes of equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game when the
exit rate converges to zero. I dene conditions onto such sequences. Because I want to
state conditions that are necessary for convergence to a Walrasian limit, these conditions
are stated directly onto limits. The main result is that a sequence of outcomes that has
uniformly bounded variation and satises feasibility becomes Walrasian if and only if
these conditions hold.
The assumption that the sequence has uniformly bounded variation5 ensures that a
pointwise convergent subsequence exists (by Helleys selection theorem; see Kolmogorov
and Fomin, 1970).6 A su¢ cient condition for a set of functions to have uniformly bounded
variation is that the functions are monotone (see the discussion following Corollary 1).
Let A be the limit of some convergent subsequence, A =
 
V S; V B, QS; QB

. The following
conditions are with respect to A.
The rst two conditions are both requirements with respect to the slope of the elements
of limit outcomes. A sequence of outcomes satises Monotonicity (Condition 1) if, for
any limit outcome, QS is nonincreasing and QB is nondecreasing.
5A family  of functions f : [0; 1]! [0; 1] has a uniformly bounded variation if there is some constant
C s.t.
Pn
k=1 jf (xk)  f (xk 1)j  C for every nite partition 0 = x1 < x2 <    < xn = 1.
6Uniformly bounded variation is a technical condition that ensures that the set of outcomes is
sequentially compact. I would not need this condition (the condition would be trivial) if I would work
with a nite set of N types. With a nite set of types, the set of outcomes would be [0; 1]2N (payo¤s and
trading probabilities for each type), which is compact.
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No Rent Extraction (Condition 2) requires that, rst, a   b  V S (b)   V S (a)  0 if
a  b, and, second, whenever QS (cx) = 1 for some cx, then V S (c)  V S (cx) + (cx   c)
for all c. Thus, the sellerspayo¤s must be nonincreasing in costs, and the di¤erence
between the payo¤s of any two types must be no more than the di¤erence between the
types. Furthermore, whenever some type cx trades with probability one, then all other
sellers must receive at least the same payo¤plus the di¤erence in costs (cx   c). Similarly,
for buyers, rst, 0  V B (b)  V B (a)  b a if a  b, and, second, whenever QB (vx) = 1,
then V B (v)  V B (vx) + (v   vx).
A sequence of outcomes satises Pairwise E¢ ciency of Available Types, if, for any pair
of types cx and vx for which it is true that QB (v) < 1 for all v below vx and QS (c) < 1
for all c above cx, then payo¤s are V S (c) + V B (v)  v   c for all v < vx and c > cx.
Thus, payo¤s are pairwise e¢ cient for those types who do not trade with probability one.
For interpretations and applications, this condition is split into two parts. For this
split, I use two sequences of functions which act as indicator functions. Let Ljk : [0; 1] 
4 ! [0; 1] with j 2 fB; Sg. Given the sequence, let the limits be LB (v)  lim inf LBk (v; Ak)
and LS (c)  lim inf LSk (c; Ak). The interest in these functions is in whether their limit is
equal to one or not. The desired interpretation of these indicator functions in search and
bargaining games is as matching probabilities: LB (v) is the probability to be matched
with a buyer having valuation above v and LS (c) is the probability to be matched with
a seller having costs below c. Given this interpretation, each of the following conditions
has a distinct economic meaning, and each condition can fail independently.
A sequence of outcomes satisesAvailability (Condition 3) relative to a pair of sequences
of functions LBk and L
S
k if Q
B (v) < 1 for all v below some vx implies that LB (v) = 1 for
all v < vx and if QS (c) < 1 for all c above some cx implies that LS (c) = 1 for all c > cx.
Thus, traders who do not trade with certainty are available in the limit, with availability
dened as LB or LS converging to one.
A sequence of outcomes satises Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency (Condition 4) relative to
a pair of functions LBk and L
S
k if for any pair of types c and v for which L
S (c) = 1 and
LB (v) = 1, the sum V S (c)+ V B (v)  v c. Thus, for all pairs of traders v and c who are
available, the sum of the expected payo¤s exceeds the private surplus between the types.
By construction, Availability and Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency hold if and only if Pairwise
E¢ ciency of Available Types is true.
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3.2 Main Result
In this section, I state and prove my main result. A sequence of outcomes converges is
said to converge pointwise to the set AW if it converges pointwise everywhere, except
possibly at pw. The result weakens the pairwise e¢ ciency requirement from Lemma 2 and
requires pairwise e¢ ciency only for a subset of availabletypes. The No Rent Extraction
condition is then used to extend pairwise e¢ ciency to all pairs.
Proposition 1 Suppose some sequence fAkg1k=1 satises feasibility and has uniformly
bounded variation. Then, the sequence converges pointwise to the Walrasian outcome AW
if and only if the sequence satises Monotonicity, No Rent Extraction, and Weak Pairwise
E¢ ciency of Available Types.
Proof of Proposition 1: Every sequence of functions with uniformly bounded variation
has a pointwise convergent subsequence by Helleys selection theorem, see above. Therefore,
I can work with the limit of some convergent subsequence, A.
Given the limit A, dene cuto¤types cx and vx as the highest cost and lowest valuation
such that traders with these types trade with certainty: cx  sup

cj QS (c) = 1	 if there
is some c such that QS (c) = 1 and cx = 0 otherwise. Similarly, vx  inf

vj QB (v) = 1	
if QB (v) = 1 for some v and vx = 1 otherwise. First, I show that the No Rent Extraction
condition implies
V S (c)  V S (cx) + (cx   c) for all c,
and V B (v)  V B (vx) + (v   vx) for all v.
For all types c 2 [cx; 1], the rst inequality follows directly by the No Rent Extraction
condition: if cx < c, No Rent Extraction requires that (cx   c)  V S (c)   V S (cx). For
types c 2 [0; cx], the inequality is trivially true if cx = 0; if cx > 0, one can choose
"  0 arbitrarily close to zero with QS (cx   ") = 1 by denition of cx. Hence, for all c 
cx  ", the No Rent Extraction condition implies that V S (c)  V S (cx   ") + (cx   c)  ".
Because the No Rent Extraction condition implies (Lipschitz-)continuity of the payo¤s
and because " is arbitrary, V S (c)  V S (cx) + (cx   c). So, the rst inequality holds for
all c 2 [0; 1]. The second inequality follows for buyers by symmetric reasoning. Adding
the two inequalities yields a lower bound on the sum of the payo¤s of all types c and v:
V S (c) + V B (v)  v   c+ V S (cx) + V B (vx)  (vx   cx) . (1)
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Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency of Available Types implies that the right-hand side is at least
(v   c). Consider two cases for the ordering of cx and vx. First, suppose vx   cx > 0.
By the denition of cx and vx, the trading probabilities QS (c) < 1 for all c > cx and
QB (v) < 1 for all v < vx. Therefore, by Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency of Available Types and
by continuity of payo¤s, the sum of the expected payo¤s V S (cx)+ V B (vx)  vx cx in the
rst case. Now, consider the second case, vx  cx  0. This case is trivial: Since (vx   cx)
is non-positive and payo¤s are non-negative, the sum V S (cx) + V B (vx)  vx   cx. So,
for both possible orderings of cx and vx, the sum of the last three terms from equation
(1) is positive; hence, for all v and for all c, V S (c) + V B (v)  v   c (payo¤s are pairwise
e¢ cient).
By continuity of the integral operator, feasibility of each Ak implies feasibility of the
limit. According to Lemma 2, feasibility and pairwise e¢ ciency of the limit outcome
implies A 2 AW . By Monotonicity of the limit functions, the limit trading probabilities
must be exactly inQW .7 Similarly, continuity of payo¤s implies that the limit payo¤s must
be exactly in V W . (Otherwise, if for some type c, V S (c) > pw   c, the continuity of V S
would imply that payo¤s are higher than pw  c for an open set of sellerstypes, implying
that S
 
A

> S, a contradiction.) Thus, I have proven that the limit of every convergent
subsequence is AW , which implies that limk!1Ak = AW for the original sequence.
Necessity of the conditions is shown as follows. Suppose the sequence fAkg becomes
Walrasian. Monotonicity: The limit trading probabilities of sellers are monotone because
those sellers with costs below pw trade with probability one, while those with costs
above pw trade with probability zero. (Trading probabilities at pw are not determined.)
A symmetric observation applies to buyers. No Rent extraction: Sellers payo¤s are
decreasing at a slope equal to minus one if c < pw and payo¤s have a slope of zero for all
c > pw. So, the slope is bounded within [ 1; 0], and the slope is equal to  1 if QS (c) = 1.
Again, a symmetric observation applies to buyers. Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency of Available
Types: Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency holds for all types because the Walrasian outcome is
such that V S (c) + V B (v)  (v   pw) + (pw   c) for all v and all c. QED:
Intuition. The proof starts by dening cut-o¤ types cx and vx such that types above
cx and below vx trade with probability less than one. The outcome for intermediate types
with valuations and costs below vx and above cx is pairwise e¢ cient by Weak Pairwise
E¢ ciency of Available Types. The No Rent Extraction allows extending this e¢ ciency
result to the extreme types (buyers with valuations above vx and sellers with costs below
7This is the only place where monotonicity is used.
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cx) who might not be available. This implies pairwise e¢ ciency for all types. Lemma 2
implies that the outcome must be equivalent to the competitive outcome. Monotonicity
and No Rent Extraction imply that the limit outcome is exactly Walrasian.
Independence of Conditions. Given Feasibility and Uniformly Bounded Variation,
the No Rent Extraction condition and the Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency condition jointly
imply that every limit outcome is equivalent to the Walrasian outcome. Monotonicity is
therefore essentially implied by the other conditions. Monotonicity is stated as a separate
condition because the cost of requiring it in applications is low and because it ensures
exact convergence to the Walrasian outcome.
No Rent Extraction and Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency of Available Types are independent,
either conditional on Feasibility and Uniformly Bounded Variation or not. An example
where the No Rent Extraction fails but not Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency is discussed on
p.19. Examples where No Rent Extraction may hold but Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency fails,
are outcomes from models with entry, see Section 5.1, and models where bargaining is
according to a simultaneous double auction, see p.22.
Feasibility and Uniformly Bounded Variation of the elements of the sequence are
independent of the three conditions onto the limit. Feasibility is not implied by any
combination of the other conditions. Examples of a sequence of outcomes satisfying all
conditions except feasibility are outcomes from models with exogenous stocks, discussed in
Section 5.2. Feasibility implies neither No Rent Extraction nor Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency.
All failures of convergence to the competitive outcomes discussed in Section 4 are examples.
4 An Application of the Main Proposition
4.1 A Parameterized Class of Games
I introduce a parameterized example of a steady-state dynamic matching and bargaining
game that illustrates how Proposition 1 can be applied. The parameterized example is
a simplication of models by Gale (1987), Mortensen and Wright, and by Satterthwaite
and Shneyerov (2008).
Traders interact repeatedly in a stationary market over innitely many periods. At
the beginning of each period, there is a stock of traders. This stock is characterized by
the distribution of the types. S (c) is the mass of sellers in the stock with costs below
c, and B (v) is the mass of buyers with valuations below v. The stock is endogenously
determined. Within each period, the interaction of traders is as follows:
1. Matching. Buyers and sellers from the stock are randomly matched into groups
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consisting of either one buyer and one seller or one buyer and two sellers, depending
on a parameter . The probability that a buyer is matched with one or two sellers is
(1  ) S(1)
M
and 
2
S(1)
M
, respectively, with M = max

(1  ) S (1) + 
2
S (1) ;B (1)
	
.
The probability that a seller is matched either alone with a buyer or together with another
seller and a buyer is (1  ) B(1)
M
and  
B(1)
M
, respectively. If  = 0, all matches are in
pairs of one buyer and one seller, and if  = 1 all matches are between one buyer and
two sellers. The parameter  measures the degree of direct competition between sellers.8
Matching is independent of the types so that the type of any given trader in a match is
distributed according to the distribution of types in the stock. The matching technology
is similar to De Fraja and Sakovics (2001) and allows me to capture one-to-one, and
two(many)-to-one matching. Sellers do not observe whether they have a competitor.
2a. Bargaining: Observation. Within each group, the buyer observes the type(s) of the
seller(s). Seller(s) observe a signal, v^ = (1  ) v+ ": The parameter  2 [0; 1] measures
how noisy the signal is, with noise " being distributed according to the standard normal.
If  = 0, the type is perfectly observed and bargaining is with symmetric information. If
 = 1, nothing about the type is observed and bargaining is with asymmetric information.
Past actions are private, that is, a traders history is private information.
2b. Bargaining: O¤ers. Having observed types and signals, one market side is chosen
to be the proposer of a price o¤er; the other side is chosen to be the responder. With
probability , the buyer makes a price o¤er, and with probability (1  ), the seller(s)
make(s) a price o¤er. The other market side can either accept or reject the o¤er. If the
buyer is chosen to propose and if there are two sellers and both accept the o¤er, each
seller gets to trade with probability 1
2
. If there are two sellers and they are chosen to
propose, the buyer can accept the lower of the two prices. The parameter  measures the
bargaining power of the buyer.
3. Exit and Entry. After the bargaining stage, traders exit and enter the market. Those
pairs of traders who reached an agreement leave the market and consume the good.
Of those traders who did not reach an agreement, a share  exits (dies) and looses
the possibility of trading. A share (1  ) of these traders remains for the next period.
Finally, there is entry by a mass GB (1) of buyers and a mass GS (1) of sellers with types
distributed according to the functions GS and GB, dened in Section 2.
The endogenous objects in this market are the distributions of types, S and B, and
the actions in the bargaining stage. The actions are denoted by aS =

pS (c; v^) ; rS (c)

8These matching probabilities arise if rst a share  of sellers are bound into pairs. The resulting mass
of individual sellers and pairs of sellers is (1  ) S (1) + 2S (1). Then, all individuals and pairs of the
short side of the market are matched randomly with the long side, so the longer side is rationed.
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and aB =

pB (v; c1; c2) ; r
B (v)

, where p and r denote the price-o¤er and acceptance
(reservation-price) strategies. For example, pB (v; c1; c2) is the o¤er of type v when facing
two sellers with costs c1 and c2. (The price o¤er to a single seller is encoded by setting
c2 = 2 as pB (v; c1; 2).) The buyer accepts a price o¤er p if and only if p  rB (v) : I collect
these endogenous objects in the market constellation  =

S;B; aS; aB

. Note that the
exit rate acts similar to a discount rate on the individual level of the agents.9 There is no
explicit discounting. On the aggregate level, the exit rate ensures that a unique steady
state exists for all strategy proles; see Nöldeke and Tröger (2009).
Each market constellation  determines payo¤s for the traders. I denote by qS (c; a) the
per-period trading probability of a seller with cost c who uses action a given . I denote
by QS (c; a) the probability to trade at some time (rather than exiting), the so-called
lifetime trading probability. Let P (c; a) denote the expected price conditional on trading.
A sellers expected payo¤ from taking action a is denoted by US (c; a). Payo¤s are equal
to the expected trading probability times the prot conditional on trade, US (c; a) =
QS (c; a) (P (c; a)  c). (If a seller does not trade, the prot is zero.) I dene qB, QB, P ,
and UB (v; a) symmetrically for the buyer. Given a constellation , maximized payo¤s
are denoted by V B (v) = supaUB (v; a) and V S (c) = supaUS (c; a) :
Steady State. The stock of buyers at the beginning of a period is characterized by B.
The mass of buyers at the end of the period is the sum of the entering buyers and the
initial buyers who neither traded nor died. B is a steady-state stock if and only if the
stock at the end of a period is the same as the stock in the beginning; that is,
GB (v) + (1  )
Z v
0
 
1  qB ( ; a ()) dB () = B (v) :
A similar condition has to hold for the distribution of sellerstypes.
Steady-State Equilibrium. A market constellation  constitutes an equilibrium if (a)
the steady-state conditions hold, if (b) the actions are mutually optimal, and if (c) the
acceptance decision is such that an o¤er is accepted if and only if it makes the receiver
better o¤ than continuation, r (c) = (1  )V S (c) + c and r (v) = v   (1  )V B (v).
This latter requirement is a renement that captures sequential rationality. Without this
renement, traders would be free to reject any o¤-equilibrium price o¤er.
9Butters (1979) and McAfee (1993) introduced the usage of an exit rate.
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4.2 Example: Unavailable Traders
I discuss a simple example in which the limit outcome is not pairwise e¢ cient. The
example illustrates that traders who trade quickly are not available. The specication
of the parameterized model is as follows: Information is symmetric (sellers observe the
valuation of the buyer), matching is pairwise, and buyers have no bargaining power (only
sellers make price o¤ers), ; ;  = (0; 0; 0). This specication allows a straightforward
equilibrium characterization. The economy is very simple: All sellers have costs of zero
and there are only two types of buyers, one high valuation type, v = 1, and one low
valuation type, v = 0:1. The mass of sellers is two, and the mass of each type of buyer is
one.
When the exit rate is su¢ ciently low, it is shown that it is an equilibrium that sellers
o¤er a price equal to one to all buyers. The equilibrium payo¤s of sellers are V S (0) = 1=2
while the payo¤s to buyers are V B (v) = 0 for both types. Sellers trade with probability
one-half, buyers having a low valuation do not trade at all, and buyers having high
valuations trade with probability one.
Observation: Let ; ;  = (0; 0; 0). Then the following is an equilibrium for all   4=5:
The bargaining prole is pS (0; v^) = 1, rS (0) = (1  ) 0:5 and pB (v; c1; c2) = 1 and
rB (v) = v, v 2 f0:1; 1g. The stocks are S (c)  1 + 1= for all c, B (v) = 0 if v < 0:1,
B (v) = 1= if 0:1  v < 1, GB (1) = 1= + 1. The equilibrium outcome is unique and
given by V S (0) = 0:5, V B (v) = 0, QS (0) = 0:5, QB (0:1) = 0, QB (1) = 1.
Proof: Step 1. The stock satises the steady-state conditions given the bargaining prole.
A buyer and a seller trade if and only if the buyers valuation is high. There is an
equal mass of buyers and sellers in the stock. Therefore, high valuation buyers trade
with probability one in any given period, qB (1; a) = 1. Low valuation buyers trade with
probability zero. The per-period trading probability of sellers is qS = 1= (1= + 1). The
steady-state conditions are easily veried. For example, the steady-state condition for
buyers requires that at v = 0:1, 1 + (1  ) (1  0) 1= = 1=, which holds. Intuitively,
if the mass of low valuation buyers in the stock is 1=, then in any period the mass of
buyers who exit (die) is (1=) , which is equal to the mass of such buyers who enter.
Step 2. The expected payo¤s are V S (0) = 1=2 and V B (0:1) = V B (1) = 0.
This is immediate for buyers, since sellers always o¤er a price equal to one. For
sellers, note that their lifetime trading probability is recursively dened as QS = qS +
(1  )  1  qSQS, and, hence, QS = qS
qS+ qS = 0:5, using q
S = 1= (1= + 1). Intuitively,
a mass one of buyers with high valuations enter the market and trade. Therefore, the
mass of sellers who end up trading has to be equal to one, too. Since the total mass of
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entering sellers is two, this implies QS = 0:5. Finally, V S (0) = QS (p  c) = 0:5 (1  0)
implies the claim.
Step 3. The bargaining prole constitutes an equilibrium.
Given payo¤s characterized before, reservation prices satisfy the equilibrium conditions.
The buyers price o¤ers are trivially optimal because buyers never make o¤ers (o¤ers
need to be only ex-ante optimal). Sellersprice o¤ers are optimal if and only if there
is no incentive to decrease prices to trade with low valuation buyers. There will be
no such incentive if the low valuation is below the sellerscontinuation payo¤s, that is,
0:1  (1  ) 0:5, which holds if and only if   4=5.
Step 4. The outcome is unique when   4=5.
First, note that buyerspayo¤s are zero in every equilibrium because sellers have all
the bargaining power. Second, every equilibrium in which sellers trade only with high
valuation buyers is outcome equivalent to the one described before. Third, if in some
equilibrium sellers also trade with buyers having low valuations, then the share of low
valuation buyers in the stock is smaller. This implies that sellers have a higher probability
of trading with high valuation buyers, which implies that their continuation payo¤s are
higher than (1  ) 0:5. Thus, o¤ering a price equal to 0:1 would not be optimal if   4=5.
Contraction. QED.
The limit outcome is not pairwise e¢ cient: For v = 1 and c = 0, V B (1) + V S (0) =
0:5 < 1 0. Thus, there are unrealized gains from tradebetween those types. This is an
equilibrium even when  ! 0 is because buyers with high valuations trade immediately
and are not available. Intuitively, only a fraction of sellers can be successfully matched
with buyers having a high type, since there are more sellers than buyers with such types
who come to the market. Thus, the fact that buyers having high valuations are not
available is driven by feasibility constraints.
4.3 Verication and Interpretation of the Conditions
The previous example illustrates that it is not immediate that outcomes are pairwise
e¢ cient in the limit. I now discuss how Proposition 1 can be applied to the class of
dynamic matching and bargaining games introduced before.
Take a vanishing sequence of exit rates fkg with k ! 0. Assume that there exists
at least one equilibrium for each k. Pick one equilibrium for each k, and denote the
corresponding outcome by Ak. This gives a sequence of outcomes fAkg. In the following,
I denote equilibrium magnitudes corresponding to k by subscripts k, such as pSk ; p
B
k ,...
I argue in the remaining subsections that this sequence satises the conditions of the
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proposition and that the limit of the sequence is therefore competitive in two cases which
are similar to the settings of Gale (1987) and Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008).10
The main purpose of the proof of the following Corollary is to demonstrate how the
conditions are applied in a particular game. I also comment extensively on how the
conditions can be veried for general matching technologies and bargaining games. The
central observations are that (i) Availability follows if the matching technology is such that
there is a positive probability to be matched with any set of traders from the other market
side who make up a positive share of the stock, (ii) No Rent Extraction and Monotonicity
hold in games where preferences (valuations and costs) are private information, (iii) Weak
Pairwise E¢ ciency holds if the bargaining game is "not too ine¢ cient," in a sense to be
made precise.
Corollary 1 If fAkg is a sequence of outcomes generated by equilibria for a vanishing
sequence of exit rates fkg, then the sequence converges to the competitive outcome AW if
(i) information is asymmetric,  = 0,  = 1,  2 [0; 1] or if (ii) information is symmetric
 = 0, matching is pairwise,  = 0, and the buyer has bargaining power,  2 (0; 1).
In the following sections, I verify the four conditions. For the result above to be
indeed a corollary to Proposition 1, it is necessary to show that Ak has a uniformly
bounded variation and that it satises Feasibility. Feasibility follows immediately from
the steady-state conditions. The fact that the sequence has a uniformly bounded variation
is veried together with Monotonicity and No Rent Extraction.
Remark. Let me discuss the remaining cases. Without providing a proof, I conjecture
that the limit is competitive whenever the distribution of bargaining power is interior,
 2 (0; 1), for all  and . If sellers have all the bargaining power,  = 0, the outcome
converges if either information is asymmetric,  > 0, or if there is competition among
sellers with some probability,  > 0. If  = 0 (sellers have all the bargaining power) and
both,  = 0 (no noise) and  = 0 (no competition), convergence fails, see the discussion
in Section 4.5. If buyers have all the bargaining power,  = 1, convergence fails for all 
and , by the same argument as for  = 0.
10An important di¤erence is the existence of an entry stage in these models, see Section 5.1. In addition,
the set of types is discrete in the model by Gale (1987), rather than a continuum. An analogous statement
of Proposition 1 for an economy with a discrete set of types would imply that the limit outcome becomes
close to the competitive outcome when the set of types becomes dense in the unit interval.
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4.4 Availability
The function LBk (v;Ak) is interpreted as the probability that a seller in the stock is
matched at least once during his lifetime with a buyer having a type larger than v before
being forced to exit, given the exit rate k and the outcome Ak. Similarly, LSk (c; Ak) is the
probability that a buyer is matched at least once with a seller having costs below c. With
this interpretation, Availability is a property of the matching technology. Availability
holds for all parameter choices of ; ; and , and it holds for all action proles (not just
equilibrium proles). For this, I show rst that the steady-state conditions imply that
types who do not trade with probability one must make up a positive share of the stock.
Then, I show that the matching technology implies that, whenever a set of types makes
up a positive share of the stock, the probability to match with such a type is strictly
positive and non-vanishing; this implies Availability. The Availability condition is easily
violated when there is an entry stage. Entry is discussed in Section 5.1.
The basic observation is the following: Traders who are less likely to trade, stay in
the stock for a longer period of time and make up a larger share of it. The steady-state
condition can be rewritten to show that:11
B (v0)  B (v00) = 1

Z v0
v00
 
1 QB () + QB () dGB () : (2)
The mass of any given type in the stock is proportional to the probability of not being
able to trade, which is
 
1 QB (), and the mass in the inow, dGB. This implies,
in particular, that buyers who do not trade with probability one make up a positive,
non-vanishing share of the stock of traders: By equation (2), the mass of these buyers is
proportional to  1
 
1 QB  GB (v0) GB (v00), while the total mass of all buyers (and
sellers) is at most  1GB (1) (by taking the integral from 0 to 1 at QB = 0). The relation
between the probability of not trading and the share in the stock is independent of the
specic matching technology and follows mechanically from the steady-state conditions.
The probability to be matched in any given period with a buyer with type at least as
large as v is denoted by XB (v), and the probability to be matched with a seller with type
at most as high as c is denoted by XS (c). For example, the probability of being matched
with a buyer from the set [v; 1] is XB (v) =
 
B (1)  B (v)M 1. The probability for
11Evaluating the steady conditions for B (v00)   B (v0) and reordering terms implies thatR v00
v0
 
1  (1  )  1  qB ( ; a ()) dB () = GB (v00) GB (v0). Multiplying both sides of the identity
pointwise by
 
1  (1  )  1  qB 1, yields B (v0)   B (v00) = R v00
v0

1
qB+ qB

dGB . Rewriting
further by using QB = q
B
qB+ qB implies the claim.
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a seller to be matched at least once during his lifetime with a buyer who has a type at
least as large as v is denoted by LB,12
LB (v) = XB (v) +
 
1 XB (v) (1  )LB (v) . (3)
As apparent from the denition, when k ! 0, the probability LBk (v) converges to one
if and only if the per-period matching probability is large relative to the exit rate,
LBk (v)! 1 ,
XBk (v)
k
!1: (4)
I show that the prior observations imply that the Availability condition holds. Suppose
there is some vx such that the limit trading probability is smaller than one for all types
below. Take any v00 and v0 below vx to dene an interval [v00; v0] below vx for which the
probability of not trading is strictly positive. Using equation (2), I have argued that the
share of these types in the stock must be strictly positive and non-vanishing in the limit.
The probability that a seller is matched in any given period with a buyer who has valuation
at least v00 is equal to the share of buyers with these types in the stock. Therefore, the
previous observation that the share of these types is strictly positive and non-vanishing
in the limit implies that lim inf XBk (v
00) > 0. Hence, the ratio XBk (v) =k diverges to
innity, and, by observation (4), types v  v00 become available, LBk (v00) ! 1. Thus, I
have now demonstrated that the Availability condition holds in the model relative to LB
as dened before, for all parameters ; , and . The Availability condition for the sellers
side relative to an analogously dened function LS follows from the same logic. I have not
used any assumption on the bargaining prole. Availability is indeed a property of the
matching technology only. Except for the steady state conditions, no further equilibrium
conditions are used.
One can extend the arguments from before to other matching technologies beyond the
parameterized example. First, the relation between the trading probability and the share
of types in the stock, documented in equation (2), follows solely from the steady-state
conditions. Therefore, it is su¢ cient for Availability that the matching technology is such
that there is a strictly positive, non-vanishing probability to be matched with any set
of types that make up a positive share of the stock. Importantly, it is not necessary to
calculate an equilibrium to check whether or not a given matching technology implies
12Note that by (2), the trading probabilities QBk and the exit rate k uniquely determine the stock 
B
and, therefore, the matching rate XBk (v). Thus, for given k, (2) allows to dene Lk (v;Ak) as a function
of Ak only, without reference to B , as required for the application of the conditions.
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a positive matching probability with types having a positive share in the stock. In the
current example, this property follows immediately from the matching function.
Let me discuss the requirement that the trading probabilities are below one for all
types that are above cx or below vx, respectively. The condition could be relaxed to
require only that there is some arbitrarily small " such that for all types in (cx; cx + ")
or (vx   "; vx) trading probabilities are below one. What is needed is that the set of
such type has positive mass. In particular, if the set of types were discrete rather than
a continuum, an equivalent condition would require availability of any single type who
trades with probability less than one. It is because of this reason that I summarize this
condition as requiring availability of those types who do not trade with certainty, despite
the fact that the statement of the condition imposes the much stronger requirement that
all types above (below) do not trade with certainty, too.
Failure of Availability with Entry. Availability does not hold in models with an entry
stage: Agents who do not enter are not available even though they trade with probability
zero. Entry is discussed in Section 5.1.
4.5 Monotonicity and No Rent Extraction
TheMonotonicity and the No Rent Extraction conditions are immediate whenever bargaining
takes place under asymmetric information. With asymmetric information, the trading
probability and the expected price paid by an agent depend only on the action that is
chosen in the bargaining game but not on the type. In such games, Monotonicity and No
Rent Extraction follow from incentive compatibility conditions.
Bargaining is said to be under asymmetric information if the sellerssignals about the
buyerswillingness to pay are not informative,  = 1, and if the buyers never make o¤ers,
 = 0.13 I discuss the sellersside (the buyers side is analogous). In equilibrium, the
optimality condition requires that the action that is chosen by a type c, a (c), maximizes
expected payo¤s, a (c) 2 arg maxUS (c; a), and the equilibrium payo¤ is given by V S (c) =
maxaQ
S (a; c) (P (c; a)  c). If  = 1 and  = 0, the trading probability and the expected
price do not depend on the type but only on the action, that is, QS (a; c0) = QS (a; c00) and
P (c0; a) = P (c00; a) for all actions and for all types c0 and c00. Now, the desired properties
follow from standard reasoning about Bayesian incentive compatibility when expected
utility is linear in the type (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, Proposition
13Buyers should never make o¤ers, because, by assumption, buyers observe the types of the sellers.
This assumption is made to keep the notation simple and, if buyers make o¤ers but do not observe the
sellerstypes, symmetric arguments apply.
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23.D.2). Optimality of equilibrium actions requires that for any two types c0 and c00,
V S (c0) = QS (a (c0) ; c0) (P (c0; a (c0))  c0)  QS (a (c00) ; c00) (P (c00; a (c00))  c0)
= V S (c00) +QS (a (c00) ; c00) (c00   c0) .
Using a similar revealed preference argument for V S (c00) implies the following bound on
the payo¤ di¤erence:
QS (a (c0) ; c0) (c00   c0)  V S (c0)  V S (c00)  QS (a (c00) ; c00) (c00   c0) . (5)
This bound holds for every exit rate. Given a sequence of equilibrium trading probabilities
and payo¤s with pointwise limits QS and V S, it must be true that
QS (c0) (c00   c0)  V S (c0)  V S (c00)  QS (c00) (c00   c0) . (6)
Suppose that c00 > c0. The inequalities (6) imply that the equilibrium trading probabilities
are monotone non-increasing, QS (c0)  QS (c00). Thus, trading probabilities satisfy the
Monotonicity condition. Moreover, the No Rent Extraction condition holds. Suppose
that c0 > c00. The rst part of the condition is immediate since QS (c0) (c00   c0)  0 and
QS (c00)  1 together imply that the slope of the payo¤s is bounded between zero and
minus one, 0  V S (c0)  V S (c00)  (c00   c0) for c0 > c00, as required. For the second part
of the condition, suppose that QS (c00) = 1. Then, the second inequality from (6) implies
that V S (c0)  V S (c00) + (c00   c0), as required.
Bounded Variation. With asymmetric information, every sequence of equilibrium
outcomes has uniformly bounded variation. The inequalities (5) imply that the equilibrium
trading probabilities and the equilibrium payo¤s must be monotone functions for all exit
rates. Thus, if fAkg is a sequence of equilibrium outcomes, all of the elements of the
sequence are monotone functions. Moreover, by denition, the trading probabilities and
the payo¤s are uniformly bounded by zero and one. For a family of uniformly bounded
functions, monotonicity is a su¢ cient condition for uniformly bounded variation (see
Kolmogorov and Fomin, 1970); so, the claim follows.
With asymmetric information, it is not necessary to fully characterize equilibrium in
order to check whether or not it is true that the Monotonicity and the No Rent Extraction
conditions hold. Instead, with asymmetric information, the Monotonicity and the No Rent
Extraction condition follow from the fact that equilibrium outcomes must satisfy standard
incentive compatibility constraints.
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Failure of No Rent Extraction with Symmetric Information. According to the discussion
before, the No Rent Extraction condition is most likely to fail in a situation with symmetric
information. Consider the basic example with symmetric information in which only sellers
make price o¤ers ( = 0;  = 0;  = 0). This case is analyzed in Lauermann (2011).14
It is shown that the limit outcome is not the Walrasian outcome. The reason for the
failure of convergence is the failure of the No Rent Extraction. Since sellers have all the
bargaining power, they receive the whole trading surplus. Consequently, buyerspayo¤s
are zero, independent of their type; that is, the rent of the buyers is extracted (this is
what motivated the name of the condition). Because it can be shown that there must be
some interior type of buyer who trades with probability one in the limit, the fact that
the buyerspayo¤s are constant at zero implies that the No Rent Extraction condition is
violated. The other three conditions continue to hold.
Interior Bargaining Power. In Gales (1987) original model, buyers can make o¤ers
as well; that is,  is strictly positive. In this case, the basic example with symmetric
information has a property that makes it similar to a game with asymmetric information.
Consider, again, the basic example with symmetric information and pairwise matching.
But, in contrast to the case considered in the previous paragraph, suppose buyers have
some bargaining power ( 2 (0; 1) ;  = 0;  = 0). Although it is still true that a trader of
type v does not need to receive the same o¤ers as a trader of type vx, such a type can
make the same o¤ers when chosen to be the proposer. Importantly, in equilibrium, payo¤s
depend only on the o¤ers made when chosen to be the proposer. (If a trader is chosen to
be the responder, the o¤er is such that the responder is just indi¤erent between accepting
and rejecting.) Therefore, a buyer of type v can mimic the strategy of another type vx just
as the buyer can mimic the actions of another type with asymmetric information. This
is su¢ cient to restore No Rent Extraction.15 Since the other conditions hold as well, this
implies that the bargaining game with symmetric information is Walrasian. Somewhat
surprisingly, it turns out that interior bargaining power and private information play a
similar role, namely, ensuring that the No Rent Extraction condition is satised.
The Role of Information. Intuition derived solely from the Myerson-Satterthwaite
14Lauermann (2011) considers homogenous sellers only. However, the analysis extends to sellers having
costs distributed according to a smooth distribution on the unit interval.
15Given some equilibrium , let PP (v) and QP (v) be the expected price and trading probabilities of
a buyer having type v who rejects all o¤ers when chosen to respond, but who makes optimal o¤ers when
chosen to propose. By the reasoning in the text, equilibrium payo¤s of a trader depend only on the o¤ers
made when the trader is chosen to propose. Therefore, V B (v) = QP
 
v   PP . This implies that, for
any two types v and v0, V B (v)  V B (v0) +QP (v0) (v   v0). Together with the observation that QPk (v)
converges to one along any sequence of equilibria for which Qk (v) converges to one, Monotonicity and
No Rent Extraction follow.
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impossibility theorem suggests that asymmetric information is detrimental to e¢ ciency.
However, this is not the case here. Asymmetric information directly implies that two of
the four conditions hold. Moreover, consider the example in which sellers have all the
bargaining power and face no direct competition,  = 0 and  = 0. Then, the limit
outcome is e¢ cient if information is asymmetric ( = 1), but the limit is ine¢ cient if
information is symmetric ( = 0), as shown in Lauermann (2011) and as discussed in
the previous paragraphs. The current framework allows interpreting the counterintuitive
ndings about private information as ensuring the No Rent Extraction condition.
4.6 Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency
Bargaining protocols with symmetric information that specify a surplus sharing rule such
as Nash bargaining satisfy Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency since the total expected surplus
is always realized. In general, it is critical that the bargaining protocol is not too
ine¢ cient.This is a new characterization of bargaining protocols. Specically, a bargaining
protocol is said to be not too ine¢ cient, if, whenever the expected surplus between two
traders is positive, at least one of the traders can realize a positive, non-vanishing fraction
of this surplus (a formal denition follows).16 Conversely, if the sum of the expected
payo¤s for two types of traders is zero despite the existence of a positive expected surplus
for each of them, the condition does not hold. Two reasons for the existence of unrealized
surplus are discussed at the end of this section. First, in the bargaining phase, traders
might be stuck in a bad Nash equilibrium when actions are chosen simultaneously.
Second, traders might not try to realize existing surplus for fear of punishmentin the
future.
Consider an exit rate  and a constellation . Given a pair of types (v; c), I dene
 (v; c) = max

v   c  (1  )  V S (c) + V B (v) ; 0	 ,
x (v; c) = min

XB (v) ; XS (c)
	
,
where  is the surplus available between the types, and where x is the minimum of the
probabilities that the seller is matched with a buyer of type at least v, and the probability
that the buyer is matched with a seller with cost at most c. When V S and V B are
monotone with absolute slopes bounded by one,  is increasing in v and decreasing in c.
If x (v; c)  (v; c) is positive, then, for each type, the expected surplus that is available in
any given match is positive.
16This is again a condition on outcomes (of bargaining) to ensure that the analysis is general.
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I rewrite payo¤s recursively. Let S be the expected net gain conditional on trading.
Payo¤s are V S = qS
 
S + (1  )V S +  1  qS (1  )V S. Reordering terms yields
V S = qSS. Given some specication of the game, let S be a uniform lower bound
such that V S  Sx for all types c, all exit rates , and all equilibria. The parameter
S measures how much of the expected surplus is realized by the seller. Let B be an
analogous uniform bound for buyers, so that V B  Bx. Such bounds exists trivially
because S = B = 0 su¢ ce. A bargaining protocol for which the sum of the bounds
S + B is not trivial is said to be not too ine¢ cient.As shown below, most standard
bargaining protocols are not too ine¢ cient.
If a positive share of the surplus can be realized, Weak Pairwise e¢ ciency holds. Take
a sequence of market constellations k, and suppose that types vx and cx become available.
By denition of S and B, the sum of their payo¤s is bounded from below by
V Sk (cx) + V
B
k (vx) 
 
S + B
 xk
k
k.
Suppose there are non-trivial lower bounds such that
 
S + B

> 0. Since the types vx
and cx are available by hypothesis, xk=k !1, from (4). Therefore, it must be the case
that the surplus between cx and vx becomes zero, k ! 0, for otherwise the right-hand
side of the displayed equation would become innite. If k ! 0, then, by denition of
k, payo¤s become pairwise e¢ cient, V S + V B  vx cx. Thus, Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency
holds whenever nontrivial uniform lower bounds exist, that is, whenever the bargaining
protocol is not too ine¢ cient.
Let me consider a model similar to Gale (1987) with symmetric information,  = 0,
no competition,  = 0, and  2 (0; 1), where  measures the distribution of bargaining
power. It is straightforward to verify that the buyer and the seller can expect a share
B =  and S = (1  ), respectively. I verify this for the seller. The sellers payo¤s are
V S (cx) = (1  )
Z
 (cx; v) dX
B (v) :
This equation holds because, whenever a seller is matched with a type v and chosen
to be the proposer, the seller makes an acceptable o¤er that captures the entire surplus
 (cx; v). When chosen to be the responder, the seller captures nothing over and above the
continuation value. Observing that in equilibrium the surplus  (cx; v) is nondecreasing
in v, the above formula implies in particular that V S (cx)  (1  )x (v; cx)  (v; cx) for
all v; therefore, S = (1  ) is indeed a uniform lower bound on the sellers share of
the expected surplus x. The bound is independent of the type, the exit rate, and the
21
equilibrium as required.
Finally, let me consider a model that is similar to Butters (1979), Satterthwaite and
Shneyerov (2008), and Lauermann (2008). In these models, o¤ers are exclusively made
by sellers,  = 0, and information is asymmetric,  = 1.17 There may be competition
 2 [0; 1). With asymmetric information, bargaining cannot be e¢ cient. Still, traders can
expect to realize a non-zero share of the expected surplus. In fact, for these parameters,
S = (1  ). To see why, suppose the seller o¤ers a price that is equal to the maximal
willingness to pay of some type vx; that is, suppose that px = r (vx), were r (vx) =
vx  (1  )V B (vx) by the equilibrium requirement. In equilibrium, the reservation price
is increasing in the buyers valuation so that all buyers with valuations v  vx accept the
o¤er. The probability to be matched with such a buyer is XB (vx). The probability to
have no competitor is (1  ). Therefore, the price o¤er is accepted with a probability
of at least (1  )XB (vx). The payo¤ from o¤ering px provides a lower bound on the
equilibrium payo¤,
V S (cx)  x (1  )
 
px   cx   (1  )V S (cx)

= x (1  )  vx   (1  )V B (vx)  cx   (1  )V S (cx) = (1  )x.
Therefore, S = (1  ) is a uniform lower bound of the sellers share of the expected
surplus.18 The bound is independent of the type, the exit rate, and the equilibrium.
As I have demonstrated, it is not necessary to fully calculate the equilibrium in order
to check whether equilibrium payo¤s admit a nontrivial lower bound. It is su¢ cient to
show that individual agents have actions available that ensure a minimal payo¤. I did
use an equilibrium requirement on reservation prices that implies that the other agents
accept an o¤er whenever accepting the o¤er is individually rational. The example below
demonstrates the signicance of this requirement.
Failure of Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency with Simultaneous Auctions. Serrano (2002)
species the bargaining protocol as a simultaneous double auction.19 He shows that
equilibrium outcomes do not need to become competitive. I can replicate the main features
of his bargaining protocol in the basic example by dropping the equilibrium requirement
on reservation prices and analyzing the larger set of Nash equilibriainstead. Suppose
17In Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008), the roles of buyers and sellers are reversed: A random number
of buyers make price o¤ers to a single seller. The seller cannot commit to an optimal ex-ante reservation
price, but, ex post, he can either accept or reject the highest o¤ered price.
18It can be veried that S + B > 0 if  = 1 and sellers face competitors with certainty.
19His interest stems from the prior use of simultaneous auctions in dynamic matching and bargaining
games in the context of common values.
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matching is pairwise and sellers are always chosen to propose,  = 0 and  = 0. Consider
the following action prole with trading at an arbitrary price p: Sellers o¤er the price
p if c  p and they o¤er p = 1 otherwise. Buyers choose a reservation price r = p
if v  p and r = 0 otherwise. This action prole constitutes a mutual best response
for all k. Thus, the action prole together with the induced steady state stock implies
an equilibrium outcome for every exit rate. Fixing an action prole with a price p as
described before for a sequence of exit rates denes a sequence of equilibrium outcomes.
The sequence of outcomes satises Monotonicity, No Rent Extraction, and Availability
for every p. Availability holds for every p because, by the observations from Section
4.4, the matching technology is such that Availability holds for every bargaining prole.
Monotonicity and No Rent Extraction are immediate as well. Moreover, if the price p is
equal to the Walrasian price, then the limit outcome will be Walrasian. However, if the
price p is not equal to the Walrasian price, then no limit of the sequence is Walrasian and,
as argued in the next paragraph, the Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency condition fails. Thus, the
non-convergence result can be attributed to the failure of Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency.
To see that Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency fails, suppose that p > pw. By the specication
of the bargaining prole, buyers with a valuation below p  " never trade and, therefore,
QB (p  ") = V B (p  ") = 0. Since their trading probability is below one, these buyers are
available. For sellers, note that all types below pw make the same o¤er and, therefore, these
types trade with the same probability. This trading probability must be bounded away
from one by the feasibility constraints.20 The fact that the sellerstrading probability is
below one implies that, (i), sellerspayo¤s are bounded away from (p  c), V (c) < (p  c)
and, (ii), sellers with costs below p are available. Take some pair of types with c < p
and v = p   ". Since these types are available, Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency requires that
V S (c) + V B (p  ")  p  c  " for all ". However, the earlier observations imply that, for
small enough ", (p  c  ") > V S (c)+ V B (p  "), since V B (p  ") = 0 and V S (c) < p c.
Failure of Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency with Observable Actions. I use the fact that the
continuation payo¤s are xed when proving Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency. The assumption
that continuation payo¤s are independent of a traders current action is motivated by
the assumptions that histories are private information and that there is a continuum of
traders. Therefore, deviations cannot trigger a change in continuation payo¤s, since, given
the random matching technology, a trader will almost never meet the same partner again
(or the partners partner or the partners partners partner, etc. ).
20The mass of buyers with valuations above p exceeds the mass of sellers below p, since, by denition
of pw and the assumption that p > pw, GS (p) > 1   GB (p). Thus, feasibility implies that the trading
probability of the sellers cannot be one; see Section 4.2.
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If actions are publicly observable, however, Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency might fail. Traders
do not necessarily have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium in order to realize sure
gains from trade because of the potentially negative impact of their deviation on their
future trading opportunities. (Or, alternatively, because rejecting an o¤er is rewarded
by a subsequent increase of the continuation payo¤s.) Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990)
construct non-competitive equilibria in a model with a nite number of agents and
observable actions. They also assume that traders are not forced to break up the match
after no agreement is reached. The non-competitive equilibrium can be interpreted as a
community enforcement of fairprices. In a recent paper, Gale and Sabourian (2005)
introduce complexity costs and show that, if traders prefer simple strategies, such
non-competitive equilibria cannot be supported.
5 Extensions and Conclusion
5.1 Entry
Many steady-state models include an entry stage. With an entry stage, traders who
choose not to enter are unavailable even though they do not trade with probability one.
An entry stage typically implies multiplicity of equilibrium because it is an equilibrium
for all traders to not enter. If no other trader enters, not entering is a best response. A
sequence of no-trade equilibrium outcomes violates the last two conditions of the main
result. The trading probability is zero for every pair of types but the sum of their payo¤s
is not pairwise e¢ cient.
An example of a steady-state model with entry is considered in Gale (1987). Abstracting
from sequences of equilibria in which the number of actual trades vanishes, it is shown that
every sequence of equilibrium outcomes becomes competitive when frictions become small.
Since the stated conditions of Proposition 1 are necessary for convergence, sequences of
equilibrium outcomes with non-vanishing trade satisfy the conditions. However, for a
model with entry it is not possible to directly verify the Availability condition, with
availability dened as in the parameterized model: With an entry stage, there are some
strategy proles for which the life-time matching probabilities for some types are zero even
though the trading probability is below one (this is trivial if the types do not enter). Thus,
to prove that sequences of outcomes with non-vanishing trades satisfy the Availability
condition, one would need to calculate equilibrium outcomes rst.
It is possible to modify the Availability and Weak Pairwise E¢ ciency condition so that
they are directly veriable. Specically, one may require the following: If, for any pair of
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types cx and vx for which it is true that there is either a non-empty interval (c0; cx) such
that 0 < QS (c) < 1 for all c 2 (c0; cx) or there is a non-empty interval (vx; v0) such that
0 < QB (v) < 1 for all v 2 (vx; v0), then payo¤s are V S (c)+ V B (v)  v c for all c 2 (c0; cx)
and v 2 (vx; v0). The requirement of a strictly positive trading probability ensures that
types from the respective intervals must have entered. This modied condition can be
directly veried in models with entry without deriving equilibrium. Intuitively, if there is a
set of types (c0; cx) who enter the stock and who trade with probability less than one, then
these types must make up a large share of the stock and buyers must be matched frequently
with such types. One can prove the following analogous result to Proposition 1: Let Ak
be a sequence of feasible outcomes with uniformly bounded variation and non-vanishing
trading volume.21 Then, a limit outcome exists and is equal to the Walrasian outcome
if and only if the sequence satises Monotonicity, No Rent Extraction, and the modied
condition discussed above.
The conditions can be veried directly22 in the models by Gale (1987) and by Satterthwaite
and Shneyerov (2008), using the methods introduced in Section 4. One nding is that,
with entry, convergence requires a more e¢ cient bargaining protocol. This is reected by
the modied condition which requires pairwise e¢ ciency already if only one market side
is available(trades with probability strictly between zero and one).23
5.2 Exogenous Stocks and the Failure of Feasibility
In their seminal paper on dynamic matching and bargaining games, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1985) consider a model where the stock of agents is exogenous. The composition
and the size of the stock are kept constant over time by replacing exiting agents. A model
with a similar feature has also been used by De Fraja and Sakovics (2001). Since the
stock is exogenous, it is natural to interpret the stock of traders as the relevant economy.
In both models it is shown that when discounting is removed, outcomes generically do not
becomeWalrasian with respect to the economy dened by the stock of traders. Rubinstein
and Wolinskys nding of a non-competitive yet frictionlesslimit outcome has sparked
21Formally, the trading volume must satisfy lim inf
R
QSkdG
S +
R
QBk dG
B > 0.
22However, outcomes fail the feasibility condition because of the presence of discounting and entry costs
in these models. The feasibility condition requires that the expected payo¤ equals the trading surplus
exactly while discounting and entry costs may lead to "waste". This failure is not consequential; one
needs only feasibility of the limit outcome which holds in both models.
23For example, Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008) cannot allow the seller to run an optimal auction
with an ex-ante reservation price, for otherwise the limit fails to be competitive. In constrast to the
model with entry, one can use the current results to show that in an analogous model without entry the
limit is also competitive when sellers use optimal auctions (set ex-ante reservation prices).
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much of the interest in dynamic matching and bargaining games. In the following, I will
relate their result to the failure of the feasibility condition.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) prove that the limit outcome is characterized by a
price p^ which depends on the parameters of the game (the bargaining power). Given the
price, payo¤s are v   p^ for the buyers and p^   c for the sellers. Therefore, the outcome
is pairwise e¢ cient: V B (v) + V S (c)  v   p^ + p^   c = v   c. Lemma 2 implies that
a pairwise e¢ cient outcome is competitive if and only if it is feasible. Therefore, limit
outcomes from Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) are, in fact, competitive whenever they
are feasible. However, as shown by Rubinstein andWolinsky, for generic bargaining power,
the price is not competitive relative to the stock of traders. Thus, generically, the outcome
is also not feasible relative to the stock. De Fraja and Sakovics (2001) report a similar
nding: The limit outcome is characterized by trade at a common price and the limit is
pairwise e¢ cient. Therefore, limit outcomes are competitive if and only if they are feasible.
But, again, it is shown that the common trading price is generically not competitive
and, by Lemma 2, the outcome is generically not feasible, too.24 Thus, in these papers,
non-convergence to the competitive outcome is implied by the fact that limit outcomes
are not feasible. Outcomes that are not feasible cannot possibly be competitive.25
The fact that the stock is exogenous has two implications. First, all types are available.
A trader has a positive chance to be matched with any set of types that has a positive
share in the stock. Therefore, in the limit, all pairs are formed frequently, which helps in
establishing pairwise e¢ ciency directly. Second, since the stock is exogenous, it is possible
that all traders from a large set of sellers trade with a small set of buyers, as measured by
their shares in the stock. This allows for the failure of feasibility of the outcome relative
to the stock. For example, in Rubinstein and Wolinskys model, even if the mass of sellers
in the stock exceeds the mass of buyers, all sellers can end up trading in equilibrium. This
is not possible in a model in which the inow is exogenous: If the mass of sellers exceeds
the mass of buyers in the inow, only a fraction of the sellers can trade, see Section 4.2.
Gale (1987) makes two well-known observations about the nding by Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1985). These observations are di¤erent from the observation that the feasibility
constraints fail. First, he argues for making the stock an endogenous equilibrium object
24De Fraja and Sakovics show that there exist parameter combinations for their model for which
the trading price is competitive, see their Proposition 5 and Proposition 7. This set of parameter
combinations is a plane in the three-dimensional parameter space of their model. Generically, the price
is not competitive.
25Note that the observations follow already from the original characterization result by Shapley and
Shubik (1971). Thus, the observations from this section demonstrate the usefulness of cooperative
characterization results in general rather than the usefulness of the Proposition 1 in particular.
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instead of taking the stock as a primitive. His main argument is that, in many economic
applications, the stock and, hence, the matching probabilities are endogenous (Gale, 1987,
p. 21). Second, he argues that, in his model, the exogenous ow is the appropriate static
economy relative to which one should interpret the limit price. The stock is not the
appropriate benchmark because, in his model, the stock is endogenously determined by
the equilibrium conditions and, therefore, the stock cannot be interpreted as a primitive
of the model (Gale, 1987, p. 28).
5.3 Concluding Remarks
The paper introduces a modication of a well-known characterization result from cooperative
game theory for quasilinear economies which states that a feasible outcome is competitive
if and only if it is pairwise e¢ cient. I argue that this existing characterization result
cannot be used e¤ectively to argue when and why outcomes of decentralized markets are
competitive when frictions are small. In particular, I provide a simple example which
demonstrates that in a dynamic search and bargaining game not all traders are available
to be matched with. The reason is that it is inherently di¢ cult to match with those types
that trade fast. Thus, there might be unrealized gains from trade for pairs of types when
one type is not available.
Motivated by this observation, I derive a new characterization result: An outcome is
equivalent to the competitive outcome if and only if (i) it is pairwise e¢ cient for a subset
of types that trade with probability less than one and (ii) payo¤s have a slope that is
bounded in a particular way. I argue that these conditions are directly veriable in many
games in contrast to the original characterization result. I discuss extensively what
properties of the matching technology and of the bargaining protocol ensure that these
conditions holds and I explain for what properties the conditions fail. A parameterized
example demonstrates how the characterization result can be used to investigate what
causes divergent results in the literature and how the characterization result generalizes
insights from the analysis of specic dynamic search and bargaining games.
Decentralized markets typically lack clearly specied trading procedures.26 Aumann
(1987) argues that methods from cooperative game theory are particularly well suited to
gain insights into such "amorphous" economic environments. This paper demonstrates
that cooperative methods might indeed be useful for the analysis of decentralized markets.
26"The markets which are best organized from a competitive standpoint are those in which purchases
and sales are made by auctions . . . . City streets with their stores and shops of all kinds  bakers,
butchers, grocers, taylors, shoemakers, etc. are markets where competition, though poorly organized,
nevertheless operates quite adequately." (Walras, 1874); quoted in Daggan, Serrano, Volij (2000).
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